This paper considers the evolution of a network in a discrete time, stochastic setting in which agents learn about each other through repeated interactions and maintain/break links on the basis of what they learn. Agents exhibit homophily, the preference to link with others who are similar to themselves, and they have a limited capacity for links. They thus maintain links with others learned to be similar to themselves and cut links to those learned to be dissimilar to themselves. We introduce a new equilibrium concept we term "matching pairwise stable equilibrium", and we prove that such equilibrium is unique in our model. We show that higher levels of homophily decrease the (average) number of links that agents form. However, the effect of homophily is anomalous: mutually beneficial links may be dropped before learning is completed, thereby resulting in sparser networks and less clustering than under complete information. Homophily also exhibits an interesting interaction with the presence of incomplete information: initially, greater levels of homophily increase the difference between the complete and incomplete information networks, but sufficiently high levels of homophily eventually decrease the difference. Complete and incomplete information networks differ most when the degree of homophily is intermediate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper constructs a novel model of dynamic network formation that studies the interaction between learning and homophily (the desire of agents to link with other agents that are similar to themselves) and their joint effect on the resulting network structures. Our model realistically supposes that agents do not know the full characteristics of other agents immediately and must instead learn about them over time, as is often the case in many social networks. We focus on the performance of different kinds of interaction technologies (which vary by the level of homophily), and their effect on the efficiency and performance of the network when there is incomplete information. We also analyze how networks change as the agents evolve (either through aging, changes in cultural memes/trends, or technological advances). Our work contributes to the recent theoretical literature on information in networks, such as [1] - [7] , and moves towards a greater understanding of how large-scale, heterogeneous, dynamic and self-adapting networks operate in the real world. Our model is also the first that allows for the analysis of the joint impact of homophily, incomplete information and learning on network formation.
Homophily in agent preferences is a very important determinant of a network's structure. Agents have limited time and resources to spend with their connections, so they prioritize links with those that are the most similar to themselves. As McPherson et al. [8] explains, "personal networks are homogeneous with regard to many sociodemographic, behavioral, and intrapersonal characteristics." Equally important in the process of network formation is the presence of incomplete information. Although agents vary in their characteristics, and such heterogeneity is of great importance for the network structure, the exact types of each agent are often unknown initially. This is especially true when agents are meeting and forming networks for the first time, such as when a group of new friends meets in a social network. In such cases agents must learn about other agents over time through mutual interactions.
The type and accuracy of the learning that agents undertake is strongly impacted by the method (i.e. online vs. offline) through which the agents interact. As Bargh and McKenna [9] point out, "computer-mediated communication (CMC) is not conducted face-to-face but in the absence of nonverbal features of communication such as tone of voice, facial expressions, and potentially influential interpersonal features such as physical attractiveness, skin color, gender, and so on." The authors note that the ""limited bandwidth" features of Internet communication also tend to leave a lot unsaid and unspecified, and open to inference and interpretation". Thus the technology through which agents interact strongly impacts the learning done by the agents, and since demographic features such as gender or race may not be easily observable in online settings, homophily may be weaker along these dimensions as well and more focused on other dimensions such as interests. This result has been shown empirically in papers such as Choudhury [10] , which analyzes networks on Twitter.
The main aim of this paper is to capture the interactions between learning, network formation, and homophily through a dynamic model of network formation. We consider a model wherein agents start with incomplete information about other agents, learn about each other through mutual interactions to resolve this uncertainty, and exhibit homophily by choosing to form connections only with agents who are believed to be similar and to maintain connections only with agents that they learn are actually similar. We define a new type of equilibrium based on a property we term "matching pairwise stability". This notion ensures that the network is robust to unilateral and pairwise deviations by the agents. It is closely related to pairwise stability from the economics matching literature, although our model considers one-sided matching instead of the two-sided matching in the typical stable marriage problem of Gale and Shapley [11] . It is stronger than the pairwise stability notion in the networks literature since it allows for deviations on more than one link. Importantly we show that in our setting with homophilic preferences, there is a unique stable matching. This allows us to perform comparative statics in our model free of the ambiguities that come with multiplicity.
Our results show that incomplete information can lead to lower clustering in networks than would arise under complete information. 1 The reason is that due to errors in the learning process, mutually beneficial links may be dropped by mistake. That is, two agents who are in actuality very similar in type may sever their link due to errors in the learning and end up forming links with others that are less similar. Thus in the resulting network, they may actually end up deciding to link with agents that are not actually the closest to them in type, and so more diverse connections would be formed within the network, with lower clustering overall. This result supports the ideas presented above that technologies which obscure certain types of demographic information can lead to more diverse connections in the resulting network structures.
We proceed as follows. Section II provides a literature review. Sections III-IV discuss the model and network dynamics, and sections V-VI present the results. Section VII concludes. In the online appendix [13] we consider an extension of the model to multiple stages of life/technology.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous theoretical papers in the network literature studying strategic network formation usually considered settings of complete information where agents perfectly know each other's types. For example, the papers by Jackson and Wolinsky [14] , Bala and Goyal [15] , Fabrikant et al. [16] , and Kleinberg et al. [17] all consider networks where the agents have complete information. In these models, since agents are aware of the exact types of all other agents there is no learning. However, agent learning can have a strong influence on the network formation process. Due to the noisiness in the learning process, agents may not learn their neighbors' types perfectly. As a result, their final linking decisions may not be with those agents who are in 1 Clustering is a measure of how often the neighbors of any given node are also connected with each other. Although in some network papers clustering is a result of triadic closure, it has also been shown to arise in network models featuring homophily, such as Gauer and Landwehr [12] , because the friend of your friend is likely to be close in type to you as well. Our results show that incomplete information tends to undercut this effect. actuality the closest to them in type, but instead with other agents who are further away in type. This has implications for the final shape of the network because agents may exhibit less clustering in their final links.
Existing theoretical network papers that have analyzed the effects of homophily on network structure have thus far not considered the impact of incomplete information. Examples of such papers include Johnson and Gilles [18] , which adds homophily to the Jackson and Wolinsky connections model, Iijima and Kamada [19] , which measures social distance using a special metric, that considers the shortest k distances among m total dimensions, and Gauer and Landwehr [12] which considers homophily along a continuous type space as in our paper. However, since these papers do not consider the effect of incomplete information, they do not address the impact of technological changes in information transmission, such as the internet and smartphones, on social interactions and the resulting social network structures.
Our paper is also related to engineering papers that analyze social learning, such as [20] - [23] . In social learning problems, agents learn from their peers about an exogenous state of the world by observing the actions of others. Our paper instead focuses on agents who are learning about other agents instead of an exogenous state of the world. As such, agents will wish to update their linking decisions over time as their beliefs about the agents with whom they are connected change. Thus, in our paper the network and learning co-evolve and the emerging networks evolve endogenously on the basis of each agent's private beliefs. Agents who are closer in type are more likely to be linked, but due to errors in the learning this is not guaranteed, and the technology that the agents use will affect the learning that occurs.
This paper contributes to our previous work Song and van der Schaar [24] and Zhang and van der Schaar [25] . These other papers study learning by agents about the types of other agents in the network, and they show how incomplete information and the learning process can lead to a wide variety of network structures and dynamics. However, these other papers focus on settings in which agents have homogeneous preferences, instead of the current paper in which agents exhibit homophily-based preferences and connect with other agents that are close in type to them. The other papers are applicable to economic situations in which agents have homogeneous preferences for forming connections with others, such as a labor market where workers have objective qualities. On the other hand, the present paper considers situations in which agents have heterogeneous and homophilic preferences, which results in them connecting with other agents closest in types to themselves. It is thus much more suitable for social and friendship networks as we described in the introduction. The present paper presents novel results on the impact of homophily, a force completely absent in the other papers.
III. MODEL
There is a finite set of I agents who can form undirected links with each other over a network. Agents are heterogeneous in their types, which for instance could represent their age, race, personality, hobbies, interests, etc. Each agent i has a privately known type θ i ∈ R, and this type is drawn from a commonly known normal distribution N(μ 0 i , σ 2 i ). 2 This distribution represents the specific population group that agent i is coming from, which incorporates all the publicly known information about the agent such as the agent's location or gender. This distribution can vary across agents if they come from different populations, or it may be the same if they all come from one population. 3 Thus, μ 0 i and σ 2 i may be agentspecific or may be common across agents. The mean of the distribution represents the central belief about the agent and the variance of the distribution represents the informativeness of the initial public belief.
We now define the actions and the payoffs of the agents in our game. The network is formed by the agents based on their beliefs about other agents' types. Links are formed via bilateral consent but can be severed unilaterally. Due to homophily, agents derive higher utility from links with others they believe are closer in type to their own true type. An agent i derives a utility of −|θ i − μ i j | + δ i from a link with an agent j .
Here μ i j represents the mean of agent i 's current belief about agent j 's type, and δ i represents the tolerance preference of agent i . The utility from not linking is 0.
We assume that agents are myopic, and so they will choose to stay linked with another agent if the utility they receive is positive, but will cut off a link if the utility is negative. 4 Thus the agents must make decisions in every period regarding which other agents to link with based on their current beliefs about the types of other agents. Given its utility function and its myopic preferences, agent i will wish to be linked with agent j if and only if |θ i − μ i j | < δ i .
We note that the tolerance preference δ i can be interpreted in terms of agent preferences, or more broadly as a function of the technology that agents use to interact with each other. For instance, since anonymity is easier online, interactions over the internet would have higher tolerance levels. Based on its tolerance, each agent makes its initial linking decision using its initial beliefs of other agent's qualities, and from these linking decisions the network G 0 is formed, which we call the baseline network. This represents the network at t = 0. 5 After forming the baseline network G 0 , agents will continue to interact with each other, and through this process they will learn about each other's types, update their beliefs and change their linking decisions. Interactions in our model take place in two phases: the experimentation phase and the link 2 We note that many of our results are robust to the specific distributional assumptions. The normal distribution is used here for greater tractability in the Bayes updating process. However, other distributions can also be used or analyzed, particularly through simulations. 3 Whether one or multiple population groups is appropriate depends on the detail of the initially known public information. For instance, in settings where very little is known about the agents, such as in an online website where no public details are available, the agents can be assumed to be coming from a single population group. However if the website publicly lists the nationality of each agent, then there would be multiple population groups, with a group for each nation. 4 Note that the assumption of agent myopia is common within the gametheoretic networks literature. The seminal papers by Jackson and Wolinsky and Bala and Goyal consider only static one period models without any future states, and the classic dynamic model of Watts (2001) also utilizes myopia. 5 The baseline network G 0 can be thought of as being formed during a meeting process by the agents, in a classroom, event, or gathering for instance. refinement phase. These two phases can occur repeatedly many times; repeated occurrences could be interpreted as part of the life cycle -kindergarten, public school, college, etc. These repeated occurrences can also be interpreted as the introduction of new technologies (internet/ smartphones) which change the types of the agents depending on the contexts over which they interact. We consider here the model with one iteration of these phases, and in the online appendix [13] we extend the model and discuss the implications of multiple stages of life.
In the experimentation phase, agents learn about the neighbors that they are linked with. This experimentation phase consists of T distinct action periods in which agents receive signals about their neighbors, update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion, and revise their linking decisions. At the end of each period t, each agent i receives a signal about each agent j that it is linked with, and these signals s t i j are normally distributed with mean θ j (the true type of agent j ) and variance σ 2 i j . We assume that signals are independent across agents and links. Since the agents are interacting across each link bilaterally, we assume that the information that is revealed from each interaction is private instead of public. We denote the history of signals agent i receives about agent j up to time t
The linking decision in each action period is made on the basis of Bayes rule, as an agent i Bayes updates the prior belief of any agent j that it is connected with. Agent i 's posterior belief about agent j 's type at the end of period t given its observations of agent j will be normally distributed with mean μ t i j = E[θ j |H t i j ] and variance σ 2 i j (t). As in the formation of the initial network, we assume that due to homophily agents prefer to link with other agents that have a type that is similar to their own. Specifically, agent i will remain linked with agent j if and only if |θ i − μ t i j | < δ i , where δ i is the tolerance preference of agent i . If however μ t i j is too far away from θ i , then agent i will cut off the link with agent j . After this link is cut off, no more signals will be received in future periods and so learning will cease. Given the decisions of all agents, at the end of period t the network G t will be formed. Figure 1 gives an example with two agents of the link formation and learning that occurs over time.
To summarize, the informational assumptions that we make are the following:
Assumption 1: Agents have true types that are independently distributed according to θ i ∼ N(μ 0 i , σ 2 i ). Assumption 2: Agents know their own true types and the distribution of other agent types.
Assumption 3: In every period t, agents send independent signals to those they are connected with according to the distribution N(θ i , σ 2 i j (t)). After the T periods in which agents update their links, the agents will no longer update their links until they learn all the remaining information about their neighbors. For instance, this could result from the agents becoming more patient after the initial uncertainty has decreased somewhat and thus no longer updating their links based on intermediate signals. We model this by assuming that each agent i receives a final signal (or multiple composite signals) about each neighbor j that it is . The dotted colored lines represent the true types of each agent, known to that agent himself but not his neighbor. The solid colored lines in the figure represent the neighbor's belief about the agent's type over time. We assume that the red agent has an infinite tolerance, whereas the blue agent has a finite tolerance δ b with range denoted by the blue double arrow. Initially the two agents are willing to link, as the blue agent's belief about the red agent's type is within it's tolerance range. At T 1 both agents send signals and update their beliefs about each other. The blue agent is still willing to link as the red agent's type is believed to still be just within the blue agent's tolerance range. Finally at T 2 both agents send signals again, and the blue agent decides to cut off the link as its belief regarding the red agent's type has moved outside of the blue agent's tolerance range.
still linked with, and that this signal is perfectly informative and resolves all remaining uncertainty. After finding out the other agent's type, agent i will decide to remain linked with agent j if and only if the true type of agent j is within its tolerance preference δ i , that is |θ i − θ j | < δ i . Agent j will act according to the same rule, and so agents i and j will be linked at the end of the experimentation phase if and only if |θ i − θ j | < min(δ i , δ j ). Based on the agents' decisions, the learned information network G L will be formed. Notice that this is not necessarily the network that is formed if every agent knew the true type of every other agent: agents who are not linked in G 0 because of initial beliefs, or who learn incorrectly about each other from the signals and so cut off links, will never receive the final signal that reveals each other's true types and hence never link even if they would want to link given their true types.
In the second phase, the link refinement phase, agents will form the final network based on their capacity constraints. In many real life settings, agents have limited time and so there is a maximum on the number of links they can maintain. We model this by imposing a capacity constraint on each agent c i ∈ N. We assume that agents first go through the learning stage described above, and they then apply the capacity constraint only after all the information has been revealed at the end of the first phase. This is a reasonable assumption as agents are often willing to link with more neighbors while they are still experimenting, but once the information has been learned they will narrow their choices based on other considerations. While in the experimentation phase links are made on a bilateral basis between different agents, the capacity phase serves to couple together all the links across the network.
The capacity constraint is implemented in the following manner. After the experimentation phase is over, each agent will know the true type of its remaining neighbors. If every agent has fewer neighbors than their respective capacities, the learned network G L will also be the final network G * . Otherwise some agents will break off links with other agents in order to meet their capacity requirements. We do not explicitly model the process by which this happens, but instead we will define a new type of equilibrium which is characterized by a property we call "matching pairwise stability". Matching pairwise stability means that if agents i and j are linked in the network G L but not in the final network G * , then agents i and j would not prefer to form a link with each other, by breaking other links in G * if needed to satisfy their capacity constraints. We show below that there is always a unique matching pairwise stable network for any generic G L in our model. This uniqueness is critical as it allows us to perform comparative statics of our model without the ambiguities that multiple stable matchings would bring. Figure 2 summarizes the complete sequence of events for our entire model.
IV. BELIEF UPDATING AND NETWORK DYNAMICS

A. Updating Equations
In this section we analyze in more detail the learning that occurs and the networks that can result from the experimentation periods. Since each agent's type has a normal prior distribution and the signals are also normal, the agent's posterior type distribution after each period will also be normally distributed. Given the assumptions above, we can use standard methods 6 to find the expectation of agent i 's first period belief of agent j 's type, μ 1 i j , as a function of the signals s 1 i j and agent j 's initial mean μ 0 j and variance σ 2 j :
. The belief at the end of period t, μ t i j , can be found by iterating this formula with the new signals, as long as agents i and j are still connected. However, if the expected type at the end of period t is greater than a distance of δ i beyond θ i , then in this example agent i will cut off the link and the agents would no longer be connected. Then learning will not occur in the next period and the true type of agent j would not be revealed to agent i no matter what the true type is. Similarly if agent j 's belief about agent i becomes a distance of δ j away from agent j 's true type at the end of period t, the link would also be cut off and a similar situation would result.
The probability that agent i 's belief about agent j 's type is still within a range of δ i at the end of period t conditional on being connected in period t − 1 can be calculated explicitly using standard mathematical properties of normal distributions. The following technical lemma provides an explicit expression for the survival probability fixing the previous period mean of agent i 's belief about agent j ,
The ex ante probability that a link still exists in period t can then be found by using this formula iteratively. This probability is shown to be strictly increasing in the agent tolerance δ i . In the following lemma represents the standard normal cdf function.
. Normalize the outputs by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation to get the probability in terms of the standard normal sig-
. Using the above result, we can get an explicit expression for the probability that any specific network emerges at the end of each period. (Note that this seems to be the first time in the theoretical network literature in which such probabilities are derived for an incomplete information setting.) We can fix a realization of types for the network and then use Lemma 1 to find the probability that two agents i and j are linked at the end of each period if they are linked in the baseline network G 0 . Since we assumed that all signals are independent, the probability that agents i and j remain linked at the end of the first period is the product of the probability that neither wishes to break off the link, or P(
. Then, since signals are independent across pairs of agents, we can do a similar calculation for every pair of agents linked in the baseline network to see if they are linked at the end of period 1. Finally, we can integrate over all of the possible type realizations for the network, {θ i } i∈I , to get the ex ante probability that any network emerges at the end of period 1. Notice that for each subsequent learning period up until period T we can repeat the above algorithm by taking conditional probabilities to get the probability that any network G t is formed. For instance, the probability that agents i and j are still linked at the end of period 2 is given by:
In the above expression F(μ 1 i |θ i ) represents the cdf of the belief of the mean of agent i at the end of the first period.
Using the above methodology, we can next analyze what types of networks can emerge at the end of the experimentation phase, after the final perfectly revealing signal has been sent and all of the information has been learned. To understand which networks G L can emerge, we investigate whether a link l i j between agents i , j can exist at the end of the experimentation phase. This depends on the baseline network G 0 . If two agents i and j are not initial neighbors (i.e. g 0 i j = 0), then it is certain that g L i j = 0. If two agents i and j are initial neighbors (i.e. g 0 i j = 1), then the existence of this link l i j requires that the expected types of both i and j do not move too far in the wrong direction, so that neither agent wishes to break off the link. Hence G L will always be a subset of the baseline network G 0 , and is composed only of links between agents whose expected types do not move too far away from the other agent's true type.
To calculate the exact probability that two agents are linked at the end of the first phase, we can utilize the linking probability given above in Lemma 1. We know that Lemma 1 gives the probability that agents are still linked after each period, and the probability that they will still be linked after the first phase conditional on being linked after period T is equal to 1 if |θ i −θ j | < min(δ i , δ j ), and is equal to 0 otherwise. Thus the ex ante probability that agents i and j are still linked at the end of the first phase will be strictly smaller than at the end of each period t, and can be found by integrating the probability of being connected at the end of period T over all pairs of types that are close enough together.
B. Matching Pairwise Stable Equilibrium
Now we move on to the analysis of the second phase, the link refinement phase. As stated, in the second phase each agent has full information regarding their remaining neighbors and will make linking decisions according to their own capacity constraints. We use the new property that we defined above, called "matching pairwise stability".
Definition 1: A network is matching pairwise stable if no agent can get a higher utility by unilaterally breaking off a link, and no pairs of unlinked agents can receive higher utilities by forming a link with each other while still satisfying their capacity constraints by breaking off existing links if necessary. This definition is inspired by the property of pairwise stability in the economics matching literature, as in Gale and Shapley [11] . This concept occurs in both the onesided matching literature, known as the stable roommate problem, as well as the two-sided matching literature, known as the stable marriage problem. Our definition covers individual rationality since agents must prefer all of their current links to not linking, as well as robustness to pairwise deviations by ensuring that no pair of agents can do better by linking with each other while still satisfying their capacity constraints. In contrast to the matching literature however, we show that in our setting there is almost always a unique matching pairwise stable network. 7 The major reason for this is the presence of homophily in our model. The standard Gale-Shapley models, both the one-sided stable roommate problem and the two-sided stable marriage problem, allow for very heterogeneous preferences among agents which can lead to cycles. Homophily places restrictions on how much heterogeneity there is in agent preferences, which allows for uniqueness. 8 Lemma 2: There almost always exists a unique matching pairwise stable network.
Proof: First we note that with probability 1, the distance between the true types of any two agents will be different across each pair of agents. As a result, there is never a need for tie-breaking between two agents that have the same type distance to a third.
Suppose that there are no ties in type distance, and that for the sake of contradiction there exist two distinct matching pairwise stable networks G and G . Let agents i and j be the closest in type distance pair of agents such that a link exists between them in one network but not the other. Without loss of generality assume that a link exists between i and j in G but not in G . Let the type distance between these two agents be d. Then since G is a matching pairwise stable network, either agent i or agent j must be at capacity in G and linked with agents that are all a distance strictly less than d away.
The reason that one of the agents must be at capacity in the network G is that otherwise they would wish to link with each other and both would have the capability of forming the link with each other while still satisfying their capacity constraints. This would then be a violation of the assumption that G is matching pairwise stable.
Notice now that not all of these links could exist in network G, since agents i and j are linked in G and thus each agent can form a maximum of c i − 1 links with other agents. Thus either agent i or j must be linked with another agent less than a distance of d away in network G but not in network G. This contradicts the hypothesis that the link between agents i and j is the minimum distance link that is different in networks G and G . Therefore there must be a unique pairwise stable network.
Uniqueness of the stable matching is an extremely important property of our model. If there were a multiplicity of stable matchings then ambiguities would arise over which stable matching should be chosen for analysis. In the economics literature, the way that a single stable matching is chosen over a set of stable matchings is often by defining a specific matching mechanism, i.e. an order and rules that the agents must follow to match with each other. In practice the actual matching mechanism could have a large impact on the end result, and different choices of matching mechanisms could lead to very different stable matchings.
We note that the matching pairwise stable network can be found by using the following stable network algorithm given below: Figure 3 gives an example of the stable network algorithm in action for a G L with four agents. In the first stage, the link between c, b is added to G * since both agents are under capacity. In the second stage the link between a, c is considered, but not added to G * since c is already at capacity. Finally, in the last stage the link between a, d is added to G * , and the unique matching pairwise stable network is achieved.
There are also numerous possible mechanisms that could lead to the stable network. For instance, suppose there is a random meeting mechanism between the agents. That is, in each period one link between a pair of agents is chosen at random, and the agents can form a link with each other if they both desire and one does not exist (breaking off an existing link to meet capacity requirements if necessary). Or if a link already exists between the pair, than an agent can break off the link if it desires. Under such a process, the matching pairwise stable network is the unique stable network (i.e. has probability zero of changing). 9 Furthermore, starting from any other network structure, the network would with probability 1 eventually converge to the matching pairwise stable network over time. 10 We now show some properties of the stable network algorithm which concern the impact of changes in the tolerance levels of each agent on the final network that is formed. The theorem assumes that a network G L is given, and so does not consider the impact of δ i on G L itself. 11 Theorem 1: The following properties hold for the final network G * that is obtained after applying the stable network algorithm to a learned information network G L : 1) Increasing δ i has no effect on i 's links if i is at capacity already. 2) Increasing δ i cannot affect i 's links to agents closer than δ i . 3) Increasing δ i below capacity weakly increases (cannot decrease) agent i 's links and average distance. 4) If all agents have the same δ i , raising δ i for a single agent has no impact. 5) Raising δ i for an agent with neighbors that have tolerance less than δ i cannot change the final network. Proof: 1) Fixing the network G L , increasing δ i does not increase any of the links that agent i would wish to form if it is already at capacity. Suppose to the contrary that agent i now forms a link with agent j . Then the distance between agent i and agent j must be less than the maximum distance between agent i and any of its previous links since agent i was at capacity. But then agent i and agent j would already have been linked under the previous capacity, a contradiction. 2) We assume that the agent is not at capacity, because otherwise the statement follows from 1. If an agent gets rid of a link with a distance less than its original tolerance, it must now be at capacity and have all links that are less than the distance of the link it removed. But then the agent would have been at capacity originally as well, a contradiction. 3) From 2 we know that increasing the tolerance cannot affect any of agent i 's links to agents that are at a distance less than the original tolerance. Thus agent i will not change its previous links and may form more links if it was not originally at capacity, but these links must be at a higher distance. 4) By 2, we know that none of an agent's links with agents less than a distance of δ i can change. All agents have the same tolerance so agent i cannot form any links of distance higher than δ i either. The result thus follows. 5) This follows from a similar reasoning as 4. Note that these results were proved fixing a learned information network G L . However, because δ i affects experimentation, a higher δ i leads to more experimentation and more links in G L . Therefore these results may not be true ex ante, before the experimentation phase, due to the impact on G L itself. However, when agents have complete information about each other these results will always be true. With incomplete information, the effect on the agent's number of links and linking distance in the final network may be ambiguous as we show below. We will also include numerical simulations 11 The joint impact of δ i on G L and G * will be discussed in the next section.
showing in which cases an agent's average linking distance increases and which cases it decreases for specific networks.
V. FINAL NETWORK PROPERTIES
In this section, we synthesize the previous discussions and state properties of the final networks G * that will emerge. A few properties are immediate. First of all, any link that does not get started, that is either |θ i − μ 0 j | < δ i or |θ j − μ 0 i | < δ j is not satisfied, cannot be part of the final network since no link could ever form between such pairs of agents. Secondly, all agents have their types learned perfectly at the end of the first phase. Thus for any pairs of agents such that |θ i − θ j | > min(δ i , δ j ), no link can exist between them in the final network. So for agents that are linked in the final network G * there are restrictions on both the initial expected types of agents, and on the true types of agents. For pairs of agents that satisfy both of these requirements, a link in the final network is still not guaranteed, as the expected type of any agent can still move too far away from the true type in the experimentation phase due to noise. Finally, the capacity constraint that is applied in the link refinement phase requires that agents i and j have large enough capacities and not too many links with even closer agents.
The final capacity effect serves to limit the diversity of the network's links, and with complete information agents would end up prioritizing links with those that they are closest to and ignoring agents that are less similar to themselves. Under incomplete information however, there is a positive probability that agents may form links to neighbors that are at a greater social distance away from themselves than under complete information. Furthermore, the greater the initial variance of agent types, the greater the probability that the true types of agents are further away from each other as well. Thus both effects allow for links between agents that are further away, and we show below that the level of clustering in the network tends to decrease.
A. Impact on Final Network of Removing Links From G L
We now analyze the relationship between G L and G * , specifically the effect of a removal of links from a given learned information network G L , and we show the potential complications that can arise. To analyze the effect of a removal of links, we need to analyze the stable network algorithm in more detail. As mentioned, there is a mapping between the learned information network and the final network because there is (almost always) a unique matching pairwise stable network. We now analyze this mapping in more detail, specifically the effect of removing links between agents from the learned information network on the resulting final network.
We consider the simplest case where each agent has capacity of one link and so can form a link with only one other agent. We show that even in this case complications can arise. In this simple case, each agent i will want to link with the agent j closest to itself in the network G L . If that agent j wishes to link to a different agent, then the first agent i will want to link with the agent k that is the second closest, and so forth. We consider an arbitrary network G L , and we analyze the effect of removing a single link g L i j from this network. Suppose without loss of generality that θ i < θ j and that the social distance of this link g L i j (the distance between agent types) is d. First notice that unless this link is in the final network, such a removal has no impact on the final network. Now suppose that this link is in the final network. All links of social distance less than d in the final network cannot be affected by this removal based on the description of the algorithm above. Links of social distance d or above may be affected. The first impact is on agents i and j . Both agents will now be connected with an agent further away from themselves in the final network (if they are still connected). Suppose that agent i is now connected with an agent k in the final network, and that agent j is now connected with an agent l in the final network. Then either k or l must now have a shorter link than before. In fact both must have a shorter link by matching pairwise stability unless θ k and θ l are both larger than θ j or smaller than θ i . In that case one of these agents may have a longer link. Thus while agents i and j are hurt by the removal of their link, their new partners will be hurt in some cases and will benefit in some cases. Therefore the effect of a link removal on the average distance and the total distance of all links in the network is ambiguous. This is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Suppose all agents have a capacity of 1. If a link between agents i and j is removed from G L , then the distance of the links of i and j must increase if they are still linked. The average distance and the total distance of all links in the network could either decrease or increase depending on the structure of G L . Figure 4 shows an example where the average and total distance of links in the final network decreases when a link is removed from G L . Figure 5 shows the opposite example where these metrics increase instead as a link is removed. This indeterminacy in the distances means that the effect of extra information on G * is indeterminate as well. This creates difficulties in getting tractable analytical expressions for the probabilities that different networks emerge, so we will proceed in the subsequent sections by employing simulations to analyze the forces involved. 
VI. RESULTS
In this section we will present several figures showing the results of numerical simulations for the homogeneous population network. Exact details on how the simulations are run as well as specific definitions of all the metrics that are used are contained in the online technical appendix [13] . We assume that there are 10 agents that all come from a homogeneous population with identical tolerance levels, and we show the impact of a change in social tolerance on various metrics of the network. Different levels of social tolerances can be interpreted as the effect of different technological platforms which allow for different degrees of agent anonymity, thus affecting the preferences of the agents to connect with each other. Figure 6 shows the Jaccard distance between the final network with complete information, which we call G * C , and final network with incomplete information G * as a function of the social tolerance. The Jaccard distance measures the difference in the links of the complete information and the incomplete information network. There are two different forces that affect the Jaccard distance as social tolerance increases. First a larger social tolerance tends to cause more possible links, allowing for more places in which the complete and incomplete information networks differ. This effect serves to increase the Jaccard distance. However a larger social tolerance also means that learning is more accurate, and this serves to decrease the Jaccard distance. Interestingly, the simulations show that there is a maximum value of this distance at an intermediate level of social tolerance, and the distance goes to zero as the social tolerance becomes very large or small.
We can prove that the learned information networks and the complete information network will with high probability be very similar if the tolerance is either very small or very large. If the tolerance is very small, no links form in either case. If the tolerance is very large, all links form initially and few are broken. The following result formalizes this intuition.
Remark 1: As δ → ∞ or δ → 0, the probability that the learned information network G L is the same as the complete information network G C converges to 1 and the Jaccard distance between the final network with complete information G * C and final network with incomplete information G * converges to 0 in probability.
Proof: In the limit as the tolerance goes to zero, we will have a completely disconnected network for any ex post realization of types under both complete and incomplete information, so the result holds. In the limit as the tolerance goes to infinity, the amount of learning becomes perfect, and so links in G L will almost surely be the same as the links in G C . The Jaccard distance also converges to zero in probability as a direct result of the fact that in both limits the links in G L and G C will be the same almost surely. Thus the capacity constraints will be applied in the same way for both networks, resulting in the same final networks.
We next analyze how the average number of links per agent in the final network G * depends on the social tolerance. It might seem intuitive that as social tolerance increases, the number of links per agent should also increase. However, this may not hold for every realization of signals and types. To see why, consider two social tolerance levels, δ < δ. It is true that the set of links in G L under δ must be a superset of the set of links under δ for every realization. (This is because if a link would have been cut off under δ , it would have been cut off under δ as well.) However, the capacity constraints, which govern which links in G L survive in the passage to the final network G * , may interfere with additional links being passed to the final network. Figure 7 shows the potential effects of adding links to G L . Suppose that all agents shown in these figures have a capacity of one. We note that agents i and j have the shortest social distance among all agents, and so would form a link in the final network if they have a link in G L . In addition, a link is not possible between agents l and m in either the top or bottom G * network since such a link is not present in either G L network. In the top G L network a link is not present between agents i and j , and so agent i links with agent l, while agent j links with agent m in that G * . In the bottom G L network this link Decrease in total number of links in G * as a link between agents i and j is added to G L . is present, and so agent i links with j , but agents l and m do not link. Then in the top G * final network there will be two links formed, but in the bottom G * final network only a single link will be formed. Thus the number of links formed in the final network reduces given an increase in the number of links in G L .
Since it is possible for an increase in links in G L to decrease the links in G * , the ex post effect of a higher social tolerance δ is ambiguous. Figure 8 suggests however that the average effect is to increase the total links in the network. Thus the increase in the links of G L dominates any potential issues that the implementation of the capacity constraints could cause. Figure 9 shows the average total distances of links per agent as a function of the social tolerance. This is defined as the average of the sum of the distance in types between each agent and all its neighbors. As the social tolerance increases, the number of links increases as well. However, the normalized average distance, equal to the sum distance divided by the social tolerance, increases to a maximum and then decreases. The average distance is zero at low δ since links become very unlikely, and the normalized distance is also zero which shows that the rate at which the average distance goes to zero is faster than the rate at which δ goes to zero. Thus it should be increasing in the beginning. However, at high δ the sum distance should saturate since greater social tolerance does not have an impact once the capacity level is hit.
We now show the effect of social tolerance on clustering within the network. Clustering is a measure of how frequently a neighbor of a node is connected with other neighbors of the Fig. 9 . Average distance in incomplete information final network as a function of social tolerance. Fig. 10 . Difference in local clustering as a function of social tolerance. same node, or how often friends of friends are connected. We analyze the average of the local clustering coefficient of all the nodes of the network. The local clustering coefficient of a node is equal to the proportion of links that exist among the subgraph of that node and its direct neighbors divided by the total number of links that are possible within this subgraph. Figure 10 shows the difference in the average local clustering coefficient between the final complete information network G * C and incomplete information network G * . The complete information network always exhibits greater clustering than the incomplete information network. This is due to the fact that links are more likely to be dropped in the learning process under incomplete information. However, when the social tolerance is very high or very low, the difference goes to zero, which is in line with the above simulation showing that the Jaccard distance also goes to zero as the social tolerance gets very large or very small. In fact this is a direct corollary of Theorem 3 above. Overall the results show that the effect of incomplete information is to lower the overall level of clustering in the network, which counteracts the increase in clustering that homophily tends to bring.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we formulated a model to capture the impact of homophily on the interaction between learning and network formation. Our results show that incomplete information leads to lower clustering than under complete information. The extent of the difference between the complete and incomplete information networks depends heavily on social tolerance; surprisingly, the difference goes to zero as the social tolerance becomes very small or very large. In the online appendix [13] , we consider the implications of multiple stages of life, and we show there that the difference between the complete and incomplete information networks is initially very large but eventually decreases over time.
Many interesting extensions suggest themselves. One obvious extension is to allow the signals that the agents send to their neighbors in each time period to be correlated (rather than independent). Such correlation may lead to greater clustering, because when one neighbor receives an extreme signal and so severs a link, other neighbors are more likely to receive an extreme signal and also sever the link. Another extension is to allow for indirect learning via friends of friends. If agent A is connected to agent B and agent B is connected to agent C, then agent A might learn about agent C indirectly -even if they are not directly linked (although presumably indirect learning would be noisier). Indirect learning might also lead to greater levels of clustering, as friends of friends are now more likely to find out about each other and hence connect.
